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Abstract  
The current research questioned whether public opinion on enlargement can be 
adequately explained only by economic calculation and cultural/community identity. 
When the analytical viewpoint was expanded from the conventional individual level 
to state level, it was revealed that constructivist considerations—such as the 
democratization and reunification of Europe—play a critical role in pushing forward 
enlargement. Drawing on the perspective of international relations, this study 
introduced a synthetic model to analyze public opinion on enlargement in the EU’s 15 
old member states. The analysis using a Eurobarometer dataset showed that on 
public support for enlargement, constructivist attitudes held as much sway as 
cultural/community attitudes. In fact, expectations of democratization were the most 
important determinant of support for enlargement in the case of Turkey.  
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Introduction 
 
The European Union’s enlargement entered a new phase after 2004, resulting in the 
addition of Bulgaria and Romania, neither dominantly Catholic nor Protestant countries, 
in 2007, and the remaining candidate countries (excluding Croatia) being beyond the 
“fault line of the clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) for EU member states. There 
is relatively little research on public opinion regarding "Eastern enlargement" as 
contrasted with "European integration." This is because European integration pertains to 
both the “deepening” and “widening” of Europe, while enlargement essentially is only 
“widening.” Previous studies of European integration highlighted public fears of the 
inflow of immigrants and minorities, but paid little attention to the fact that accession 
means new member states much more than new member masses. This paper, drawing 
on literature covering domestic EU and international politics, applies a synthetic model 
that incorporates economic, cultural and normative judgments to account for public 
support for further enlargement to the Western Balkans and Turkey.1  
                                                 
Acknowledgements: For assistance in obtaining and using the Eurobarometer datasets, the author is 
greatly indebted to Michael Buckup, Fabio Volante and Christelle Dewint at Public Opinion and 
Media Monitoring of the European Commission. 
1 Although one of the most controversial aspects of Eastern enlargement is Turkey’s potential 
membership, most literature on Turkey-EU relationships has tended to be descriptive or 
institutional accounts of Turkey’s attempt to join the European Union. As Uğur and Canefe (2004, 
1) summarized, these studies have discussed either the EU’s (unfair) treatment of Turkey or 
Turkey’s political and economic problems hampering its accession to the EU.1 Çarkoğlu and 
Rubin (2003) and Canefe and Uğur (2004b) were among the first studies that empirically 
examined who supported Turkey’s EU accession and why. The latter specifically revealed that 
compared with the past, the state elite had become relatively cautious about accession, whereas 
antiestablishment groups, such as Islamists and ethnic minorities, had become more supportive. 
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Review of Literature 
 
Despite the huge volume of literature on public support for European integration among 
member states,2 there have been only a limited number of studies focused specifically 
on support for enlargement at the micro level. Jones and van der Bijl (2004) used 
state-level analysis to show that aggregate support by a member state for a new 
candidate country depended on state-level factors harnessing a perception of closeness, 
such as trade relations and geographical proximity. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) 
adopted an individual-level model that used support for enlargement as the dependent 
variable, and demonstrated the primacy of anti-immigration sentiment over individuals’ 
evaluations of economic and government performance, but the sample was limited to 
Denmark and the Netherlands. A more important problem is that the few existing 
studies have tended to use the same major independent variables as those found in 
analysis of European integration, even though the latter is perceived primarily in terms 
of deepening rather than widening.  
 
The literature on European integration has broadly centered on economic calculation 
and cultural/community identity as determinants of public support. The analytical 
                                                                                                                                               
However, there has been little systematic empirical investigation into the EU side of the story. 
2 Questionnaire texts have changed over the years. The most recent questionnaire asked, “Generally 
speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing, a 
bad thing, neither good nor bad, or don’t know?” While some authors used a few question items to 
form a composite index to measure the level of support for integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005), 
the author has not been able to find any case in which an item that explicitly asked about 
enlargement was included in the index.  
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framework has been expanded with subjective-objective and individual-sociotropic 
distinctions (Hooghe and Marks, 2005), but the core argument can be summarized as 
follows:  The economic calculation model claims that support for integration is strong 
among those who stand to benefit from economic integration. Managers and 
professionals were found to be supportive of integration, while manual laborers were 
against it. The model also predicts that citizens who would benefit from EU budget 
transfers favor integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; 
Gabel, 1998a; Gabel, 1998b). Brinegar and Jolly (2005) later revised the model with the 
factor endowment theorem3 to show that support for European integration is strong 
among managers and professionals in capital-rich countries, as well as unskilled 
workers in labor-abundant counties. 
 
The cultural/community view contends that people who have strong national identity or 
hostility toward other cultures tend to see integration as a threat and thus oppose it 
(McLaren, 2002; Carey, 2002; DiezMedrano, 2003; Kriesi and Lachat, 2004; De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden, 2005). More recent studies have shown that cultural factors have a 
stronger effect than economic rationality.4 This is partly because the focus of public 
opinion shifted over the years. Initially, European integration primarily meant market 
                                                 
3 The basic logic is that those who possess relatively scarce resources in their own country oppose 
market liberalization, while those with abundant resources want to sell their capital or labor in a 
competitive market. 
4 Jones and van der Bijl (2004) drew attention to socioeconomic interaction that could strengthen 
perceptions of community between existing and candidate member states. Although this new 
perspective is important, the application of this model with regard to a limited number of 
candidate countries would bring spurious relationships into the equation.  
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integration, but since the 1990s right-wing parties have driven opposition to the 
accommodation of diverse cultures (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 426-7). 
 
Variables that account for support for integration do not adequately reflect the logic of 
public support for enlargement. First, in terms of economic calculation, European 
integration (deepening and widening) tends to divide citizens in present member states 
into winners and losers, while enlargement (widening) results in the relatively 
unavoidable burdens of higher costs and fewer benefits. Self-centered economic reasons 
for supporting enlargement are thus expected to be generally weak. Second, the 
cultural/community model depicts minorities or immigrants as threats to the member 
state’s culture. However, enlargement results in not only new immigrants, but also more 
European countries governing themselves in line with EU policies as new member 
states. Consequently, independent variables used in enlargement analysis have lacked a 
normative, constructivist perception supporting the inclusion of new member states, not 
just immigrants en masse. It is true that both economic-cost/benefit and 
cultural/community theses are deeply rooted in individual judgments. However, if 
political elites can lead and affect public opinion (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005), individuals might well also base their referendum decisions on the 
constructivist argument that enlargement promotes the common interests of the 
European Union.  
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Table 1. Studies on Support/Preferences for EU Integration/Enlargement 
 Integration Enlargement 
Independent variables Public support State preferences 
Economic calculation  
Gabel & Palmer (1995); 
Anderson & Reichert (1996); 
Gabel (1998a); 
Gabel (1998b); 
Brinegar & Jolly (2005) 
 
Hagen (1996); Hayward 
(1996); Grabbe & Hughes 
(1998) 
Cultural/community 
identity   
McLaren (2002);  
Carey (2002); DiezMedrano 
(2003); Kriesi & Lachat 
(2004); De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden (2005) 
Jones & van der Bijl 
(2004); De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden (2005) 
 
Constructivism    
Moravcsik & Vachudova 
(2005); Schimmelfennig 
(2005); Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier (2005); 
Brennan (2006); Sjursen 
(2006) 
Source: Compiled by the author from the above sources. 
 
Indeed, at the international level of analysis, the great puzzle of why existing EU 
members were willing to admit new members despite the concomitant burdens has been 
best explained by the constructivist theory that member states became strongly 
committed, whether of their own will or by normative persuasion, to a united and 
democratic Europe (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005, p. 203; Brennan 2006; 
Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Sjursen 2006). 5  In 
particular, Sjursen (2006) concluded after an extensive review of the literature that these 
normative arguments were more rights-based (constitutional democracy) than 
value-based (collective identity), and were confined to Europe because these countries 
jointly experienced the burden of Cold War division. The same logic may also apply to 
                                                 
5 While Schimmelfennig (2005) argues that pro-enlargement states used normative rhetoric, Sjursen 
(2006) points out that such rhetoric must have been accepted as legitimate by the member states 
(communicative rationality) for rhetorical entrapment to be effective. 
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support on the individual level. A synthetic view of integration and enlargement studies 
in Table 1 points to a relatively neglected area of research that incorporates a 
constructivist (normative) element for individual-level analysis. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
The current research uses the Eurobarometer 65.2 dataset to measure the importance of 
normative (constructivist) considerations in determining public support for Eastern 
enlargement in general, and Turkey’s accession in specific, in comparison with 
economic or cultural/community considerations. Two regressions are run, one for the 
Western Balkans and Turkey, and the other for Turkey only. 
 
Hypothesis 
Among previous literature, it is possible to identify three sources of public attitude in 
the member states toward enlargement, i.e., economic calculation, cultural/community 
identity, and constructivism. Only the constructivist perspective seems to give a 
substantive answer to the question of why better-off member states have decided to 
admit worse-off countries. Individual-level analyses have largely neglected 
constructivist reasons. Yet until spring 2005, opinion polls in the EU’s first 15 member 
states consistently showed stronger support for enlargement than against it (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Public Opinion on Enlargement in the EU’s First 15 Member States 
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Source: Compiled by the author from Eurobarometer, various waves. 
 
The enlargement puzzle thus seems to apply to public opinion as well. It is hypothesized 
therefore that in “old” member states, individuals who believe that enlargement would 
democratize and reunite Europe tend to support accession of new member states. At the 
same time, economic calculation and cultural/community identity are not discarded but 
integrated into a comprehensive model in order to measure the relative weight of each 
variable. The effect of this constructivist attitude is compared with those of economic 
and cultural attitudes in a synthetic model (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Synthetic Model: Independent and Control Variables 
 
Conceptualization Operationalization Question 
Economic calculation 
Job transfers  QD10a_2: Increases jobs transfer to countries where labor is cheaper.   Employment  
More workers QD10a_4: Increases influx of workers from future member states of the European Union. 
Production and trade World’s largest trade bloc 
QD10a_1: Makes European Union biggest trade bloc 
in world. 
  Resource transfers Aid for new members 
QD10a_3: Increases support for development in 
candidate and potential-candidate countries. 
Cultural/community identity 
  Multiculturalism Enriches culture  QD11a_3: Enriches Europe's cultural diversity. 
  Perceived threat Lowers living standards  
QD11a_2: Lowers standard of living in European 
Union. 
Constructivism 
  Democratization Promotes democracy QD9a_3: Promotes democracy on European continent.
  Stronger union   Peace and stability  
QD9a_1: Ensures peace and stability on European 
continent. 
Control 
  Knowledge QD1: How well informed do you feel about enlargement? 
  Political orientation D1: Left/right self-placement 
  Gender D10: Gender 
  Age D11: Age 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Eurobarometer 65.2 dataset. 
Note: Manual laborers might feel threatened by a decline in employment opportunities, whereas 
managers and professionals might welcome an increased supply of low-cost labor. Neither the 
interaction variable that tapped the effect of the manual labor attribute, nor the one that tapped the 
effect of the professional/managerial attribute, were statistically significant when included in the 
regression equation. In their responses to the questionnaire, manual laborers emphasized the threat of 
unemployment and job transfers while professional/managerial respondents did not consider this to 
be a threat. The one-tailed t-test for the difference between the two means, when applied to the above 
data, showed that the mean value of the answers was higher for both QD10a_2 (p<0.01) and 
QD10a_4 (p<0.10). 
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Data 
Eurobarometer 65.2, a special survey on enlargement (Special Eurobarometer 255: 
Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement) conducted in spring 2006, has the 
most comprehensive set of questions about enlargement of any survey to date. Its 
dataset contains questions that address the three sources of opinion, namely, economic 
calculation, cultural/community identity and constructivist variables. The set of 
independent variables and corresponding questions are shown in Table 2. First, the 
economic calculation model refers to employment opportunities, trade liberalization and 
resource (budgetary) transfers. Second, the model of culture and community involves 
multiculturalism and perceived threat to society. Third, constructivist arguments are 
represented by support for democratization and a stronger European Union. The full use 
of this data is limited, however, because in order to increase the total number of 
questions, some were asked to only half of the respondents. While the current study uses 
some of these “split questions,” the author chose a set of questions (Split A) over the 
other set (Split B), since the former included more appropriate economic, cultural and 
constructivist variables.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is public support for enlargement in the old 15 EU member 
states. For the regression concerning the Western Balkans and Turkey, it is a composite 
index calculated as the unweighted average of support for the accession of Croatia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Albania, and Turkey. For answers to the question (QD16) “Once (INSERT 
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COUNTRY) complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be 
… to the accession of (INSERT COUNTRY) to the European Union?,” the coded level 
of support for each candidate country is in a range: 4 (“totally in favor”), 3 (“fairly in 
favor”), 2 (“fairly opposed”) and 1 (“totally opposed”). For the regression concerning 
Turkey only, the dependent variable is the coded level of support described above. 
 
Independent variables 
All the independent variables are attitudinal in order to ensure comparability. The coded 
answers range is 4 (“totally agree”), 3 (“tend to agree”), 2 (“tend to disagree”) and 1 
(“totally disagree”). “Do not know” replies are recorded as missing values. In previous 
studies about European integration, the variable of multiculturalism and national 
identity is measured by the respondent’s 1) perception of so-called minorities who have 
resided in EU member states after the Second World War, and 2) their anxiety about 
losing national identity to European (EU) identity (McLaren 2006, 69-92). In regard to 
enlargement in particular, the former question is more appropriate than the latter for 
measuring the respondent’s perception of accession. Of the two culture-specific 
questions in the dataset, the one about cultural diversity (Split A group) was chosen over 
the one about loss of own culture (Split B group). 
 
Control variables 
The control variables consist of knowledge about enlargement from 4 (“Very well 
informed”) to 1 (“Not at all well informed”), left/right political orientation from 1 (“far 
left”) to 10 (“far right”), gender (female = 0, male = 1), and age from 1 (“15-24”) to 4 
(“55 or over”). Occupational differences such as professionals/managers and manual 
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laborers were not included in the model since they slightly depress the regression 
coefficients of the economic-calculation variables. 
 
Analysis 
The above hypothesis was tested by multiple regressions. The hierarchical linear model, 
when applied to the data below, showed that the potential country-level effect was not 
substantively important. The country-level variance of the dependent variable accounted 
for less than one-tenth of the total variance of the dependent variable. The hierarchical 
linear model thus was not used for the following analysis. Also, as in this study, it is 
important to treat enlargement as distinct from integration since perceptions of the two 
phenomena are not similar. The result of a correlation analysis with another 
Eurobarometer dataset (EB63.46) showed that there was only a weak relationship 
(r=0.259, p<0.001, N=15,425) between public support for the European Union (EB63.4 
QA8a) and enlargement (EB63.4 QA28.4) among the 15 old member states. 
                                                 
6 This dataset was not used for the regressions that follow since it included few questions 
specifically about enlargement. 
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Results 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of separate multiple regressions regarding support for 
enlargement to (1) the Western Balkans and Turkey or (2) Turkey. As stated earlier, the 
independent variables are mutually comparable in each regression since they are all 
attitudinal and measured by the same four-point scale. For the Western Balkans and 
Turkey, constructivist variables were nearly as strong determinants of public support for 
enlargement as cultural/community variables. The constructivist variables “promotes 
democracy” and “peace and stability” had unstandardized regression coefficients (bs) of 
0.188 and 0.111, respectively, whereas those for “enriches culture” and “lowers living 
standards” were 0.168 and -0.188, respectively. On the other hand, economic calculation 
variables had much more limited effect on public support, with the strongest regression 
coefficient being 0.085. Among the four control variables, three were statistically 
significant. Support for enlargement is thus stronger among EU citizens who are better 
informed, more leftist and younger. 
 
Public opinion on the accession of Turkey primarily showed a similar tendency. The 
effect of constructivist variables “promotes democracy” (b=0.181) and “peace and 
stability” (b=0.103) on the average was fairly close to that of the cultural/community 
variables “enriches culture” (b=0.162) and “lowers life standards” (b=-0.167). However, 
there were two differences from the above pattern for Eastern enlargement. First, the 
economic calculation variable “job transfers” (b =-0.116) was slightly higher than one 
of the two constructivist variables, “peace and stability” (b =0.103). Second, and more 
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importantly, the most decisive reason for supporting enlargement to Turkey was the 
expectation of democratization. Among the independent variables in the regression for 
Turkey, the first of the two constructivist variables, “promotes democracy,” had the 
strongest regression coefficient. 
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Table 3. Determinants of EU Public Support for Enlargement 
 
 Enlargement scope 
 Western Balkans and Turkey1 Turkey2 
 b S.E. t p b S.E. t p 
Independent variables3         
Economic calculation         
  Job transfers  -0.078 0.017 -4.636 0.000 -0.116 0.021 -5.410 0.000 
  More workers -0.052 0.018 -2.832 0.005 -0.079 0.023 -3.348 0.001 
  World’s largest trade bloc  0.014 0.014 0.972 0.331 0.009 0.018 0.497 0.619 
  Aid for new members 0.085 0.019 4.448 0.000 0.068 0.024 2.788 0.005 
Cultural/community identity  
  Lower living standards  0.168 0.017 10.030 0.000 0.162 0.021 7.637 0.000 
  Enriches culture  -0.188 0.014 -13.406 0.000 -0.167 0.018 -9.382 0.000 
Constructivism  
  Promotes democracy 0.188 0.020 9.592 0.000 0.181 0.025 7.277 0.000 
  Peace and stability  0.111 0.018 6.140 0.000 0.103 0.023 4.496 0.000 
  
Control variables4  
  Knowledge 0.066 0.016 4.273 0.000 0.114 0.014 8.228 0.000 
  Left/right orientation -0.027 0.006 -4.769 0.000 -0.038 0.007 -5.378 0.000 
  
 
 
15
  Gender -0.027 0.022 -1.197 0.231 -0.068 0.020 -3.461 0.001 
  Age -0.066 0.011 -6.026 0.000 -0.015 0.029 -0.517 0.605 
  
Constant 1.428 0.091 15.688 0.000 1.645 0.116 14.207 0.000 
 Number of obs. = 4,489 
R-squared = 0.246 
Adj R-squared = 0.244 
S. E. of estimate = 0.738 
F-stat. = 121.518 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of obs. = 4,439
R-squared = 0.170 
Adj R-squared = 0.167 
S. E. of estimate = 0.933
  F-stat. = 75.339
Prob > F = 0.000
Source: Compiled by the author from the Eurobarometer 65.2 dataset. 
Note: Entries are results of two multiple regressions. 
1 The dependent variable is support for accession averaged out for Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Albania, and Turkey. Support for accession of each country is measured on a four-point scale: 4 (“totally in favor”), 3 (“fairly in favor”), 2 
(“fairly opposed”) and 1 (“totally opposed”). “Do not know” replies are recorded as missing values. 
2 The dependent variable is support for accession of Turkey. 
3 The independent variables are measured on a four-point scale: 4 (“totally agree”), 3 (“tend to agree”), 2 (“tend to disagree”) and 1 (“totally disagree”). “Do 
not know” replies are recorded as missing values. 
4 Knowledge about enlargement is measured on a four-point scale ranging from 4 (“very well informed”) to 1 (“not at all well informed”), left/right political 
orientation on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 (“far left”) to 10 (‘far right”), and age on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (“15-24”) to 4 (“55 or over”). 
Gender is a dummy variable with female = 0 and male = 1.
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Conclusion 
 
The current research questioned whether public opinion on enlargement can be 
adequately explained only by economic calculation and cultural/community identity. 
When the analytical viewpoint was expanded from the conventional individual level to 
state level, it was revealed that constructivist considerations—such as the 
democratization and reunification of Europe—play a critical role in pushing forward 
enlargement. Drawing on the perspective of international relations, this study 
introduced a synthetic model to analyze public opinion on enlargement in the EU’s 15 
old member states.   
 
The foregoing analysis using a Eurobarometer dataset showed that on public support for 
enlargement, constructivist attitudes—particularly expectations of 
democratization—held as much sway as cultural/community attitudes. In fact, 
expectations of democratization were the most important determinant of support for 
enlargement in the case of Turkey. Economic calculations generally played a much less 
significant role in shaping support for enlargement, except the fear of job transfers to 
Turkey, which had a tangible effect on support for this country’s accession.  
 
In conclusion, EU citizens who support further enlargement tend to be people who 
accept cultural pluralism in their own countries, and also believe in extending both 
democracy and EU norms beyond existing borders. Thus, the most crucial difference in 
opinion between the protagonists and antagonists of enlargement seems to lie in 
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whether the inclusion of new members would contribute to the democratization and 
stabilization of the European region or not.  
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